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TOWARDS A RECOGNITION OF THE NECESSITY
DEFENSE FOR POLITICAL PROTESTERS
MATTHEw LnpmAN*
The world has witnessed the rise of "people power." Regimes have
been shaken and toppled due, in large part, to the mass, nonviolent actions
of their citizens. In the United States, civil disobedience tactics increasingly
have been deployed by unionists, environmentalists, peace activists, tax
resisters, advocates for the homeless, educational reformers, and those
embroiled in the debate over AIDS and abortion. Ironically, while American
political leaders generally have praised, supported, and encouraged non-
violent movements abroad, they often have condemned, frustrated, and
attacked such movements at home.
Much of this contemporary American civil disobedience is distinguished
by the fact that disobedients, rather than following the traditional practice
of entering a guilty plea and accepting their punishment, claim that their
actions are justified under international law and argue that it is the state
which is acting in a criminal fashion. These new self-proclaimed civil resisters
view themselves as inheritors of the Nuremberg tradition that they claim
morally and legally obligates citizens to resist the internationally illegal
conduct of regimes. Such civil resisters typically have relied upon the
common-law necessity defense as a mechanism that entitled them to raise
indirectly their international law defense. The appellate judiciary, however,
almost uniformly has ruled that the necessity defense is inapplicable as a
matter of law in cases of political protest.
This essay contends that the United States, with its rich tradition of
civil disobedience and commitment to democracy, should recognize the right
of civil resisters to rely upon the necessity defense.' Initially, it is argued
that the Nuremberg Principles and international human rights law establish
an internationally recognized privilege of citizen intervention to prevent
illegal governmental activity. This notion of legally justifiable civil resistance
then is contrasted with the traditional concept of civil disobedience. In
conclusion, the refusal of the appellate judiciary to permit civil resisters to
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rely upon the necessity defense and to raise indirectly international law
arguments is outlined and criticized.
NuREMBERG AND THm RELEvANcE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Nuremberg Tribunal variously convicted twenty-two Nazi war crim-
inals of crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
These narrowly based convictions perhaps are of less historical significance
than are the broad principles enunciated in the Tribunal's decision. These
principles served as a catalyst for a revolutionary shift in international law
towards the protection of individual human rights.2
The Tribunal pronounced that individuals have international obligations
that transcend the requirements of domestic law. These international duties
apply to government leaders and to members of the military as well as to
private individuals. The Tribunal also ruled that the act of state defense,
that historically immunized government leaders from liability for acts com-
mitted in the course of their official activities, was not applicable. The
Tribunal further established that the superior orders defense only was
available in mitigation of punishment if, under the totality of circumstances,
the defendant was unable to exercise a moral choice.3
The Tribunal's decision firmly established that the conduct of states,
rather than being a cynical exercise of raw power, was constrained and
guided by the rule of international law. International law was the standard
by which the legality of government action was to be evaluated and
individuals' ultimate loyalty was to universally applicable principles rather
than to the dictates of a particular legal code. 4
Nuremberg thus established that there are legal limits on state power
and that respect for individual integrity is the duty of all sovereign states.
A regime which persistently and systematically violates this obligation for-
feits its claim to demand the loyalty of its citizens. Perhaps the most lasting
significance of the Nuremberg trial is that the trial served as a catalyst for
the creation of international system of individual rights and duties. The
charge of crimes against humanity, that ironically the Tribunal vaguely
defined and largely ignored, provided the intellectual basis for the devel-
opment of a comprehensive regional and international system for the pro-
tection of human rights applicable during periods of domestic peace (wartime
being ruled by the system of humanitarian law).5 These human rights
2. For a discussion of Nuremberg, see Lippman, Nuremberg, supra note 1.
3. See XXII TRiAL OF mE MAJOR WAR CRmNALs BEFORE Tm INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TaxaNAL 466 (1947).
4. It is significant that the Nuremberg defendants were tried and convicted before an
international military tribunal and proposals for their summary execution were rejected as
contrary to due process and to the rule of law. A judicial trial was thought to be the best
mechanism for establishing principles of international law to guide the future conduct of states.
See generally Lippman, Nuremberg, supra note 1.
5. The Nuremberg Tribunal recognized that crimes against humanity are not limited
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instruments, beginning with the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 6 establish and protect certain civil, political, social, and cultural
rights; and designate various severe deprivations of human rights as inter-
national crimes.
This system of individual rights and state duties, as suggested, is an
extension of the spirit of Nuremberg. Following the horror of World War
II, the Allied Powers were determined to spread democratic values to guard
against the re-emergence of fascism. Democratic theory dictates that indi-
viduals not only should be free from government repression and persecution,
but that states should be charged with the positive duty of guaranteeing the
minimum conditions required for human development. While Nuremberg
primarily was concerned with Germany's treatment of the citizens of oc-
cupied countries, the human rights movement imposed general standards of
conduct on states towards their own citizens. All peoples were viewed as
possessing inherent rights which transcend geography, ideology, and the
sovereign prerogative of states. The rhetoric of rights was adopted to
emphasize that these protections were envisioned as legally enforceable
entitlements. Thus, the sphere of state sovereignty became limited by the
international obligation to safeguard human rights. The respect for and the
protection of these rights became matters of international concern that no
longer were considered to be strictly within states' domestic jurisdiction. In
terms of international law, the individual then was transformed from an
"object" into an active "subject" with legal standing and justiciable claims
against the individual's parent state.
NUREMBERG AND THE CoNFLIcT BETWEEN Doiisnc
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
International human rights instruments provide for relatively ineffectual
mechanisms for the receipt, investigation, and adjudication of complaints.
7
The primary responsibility for the protection of human rights, of necessity,
is vested in domestic courts. However, many countries with records of
human rights abuse are governed under states of emergency or by military
regimes. The military in these countries has restricted the jurisdiction of
civilian courts, or military tribunals have supplanted the courts. In such
circumstances, there is little realistic opportunity for litigants to obtain
necessarily to acts that occur during periods of armed conflict. However, it limited its
jurisdiction to acts that occurred after the initiation of Germany's war of aggression in 1939.
The concept of crimes against humanity suggests that "humanity" carries with it certain
inherent minimal prerogatives and protections. See XXII TiAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CnUNAIS
BEFORE THE INTEmRATIONAL Mm-rrARY TsmuNAL 498 (1947).
6. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations General Assembly, Dec. 10,
1948, G.A. Res. 217A, 3 GAOR, Resolutions (A/810), at 7.
7. See generally Lippman, Human Rights Revisited: The Protection of Human Rights
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 450
(1980).
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judicial redress of their grievances." Even in democratic states, the judiciary
has been reluctant to assume jurisdiction over governmental activities alleged
to be violative of international law. In the United States, courts generally
have ruled that the adjudication of international claims would violate the
political question doctrine by compelling courts to determine issues consti-
tutionally reserved to the executive or legislative branches.9 Courts also have
determined that individuals lack standing to raise international claims, in
that they have been unable to demonstrate that they are uniquely harmed
by the challenged policy.' 0 In other instances, the judiciary has denied
individuals standing based on the finding that the harm, such as a nuclear
exchange, is distant, speculative, and uncertain."
The refusal of the judiciary to entertain claims based upon international
law has placed individuals in a paradoxical position. Constitutionally, the
rule of law constrains their government. Yet, the judiciary refuses to
determine whether the conduct of the government conforms to international
law. This lack of a judicial avenue for the redress of grievances, creates a
dilemma in the minds of many peop e of conscience. While law abiding,
such individuals believe that Nuremberg creates a moral imperative, if not
a legal obligation, to resist internationally proscribed governmental conduct.
Thus, when confronted by the criminal conduct of the United States
government, these individuals view themselves as having no alternative but
to violate the law.
The actual holdings of Nuremberg and the associated postwar tribunals,
however, do not impose specifically an affirmative legal duty upon indi-
viduals to prevent governmental acts violative of international law. In some
isolated instances, an affirmative duty was placed upon high-level public
and military officials to prevent the commission of criminal acts of which
they had actual or constructive knowledge. The most infamous example is
rn re Yamashita,'2 in which the United States Supreme Court recognized
the vicarious liability of military authorities. The Court imposed an affir-
mative duty upon military commanders to act within the scope of their
authority and to prevent violations of the laws of war of which they were
aware or should have been aware. 3
The duty to take affirmative acts to prevent the commission of criminal
acts, however, was not extended to ordinary combatants or to civilians. 4
8. See generally Lippman, Disappearances: Towards a Declaration on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 4 CoN. J. INT'L
L. 121 (1988); Lippman, Government Sponsored Summary and Arbitrary Executions, 4 FA.
INT'L L.J. 401 (1989).
9. See Davi v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 478, 484 (W.D. Va. 1970).
10. See United States v. May, 622 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 984
(1980).
11. Id.
12. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
13. Id. at 15-16.
14. Tribunals generally did not impose criminal liability upon civilians or lower level
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The post-World War II tribunals noted that the German people were exposed
to massive, skillful propaganda and generally were ignorant of Nazi atroc-
ities. Those with knowledge of the barbarities committed by the Nazis who
dared to protest met with savage repression. The Nuremberg Tribunal also
observed that it would impose an inordinate burden on ordinary individuals
to legally require them to discern and to apply ambiguous international law
principles in an effort to assess the legality of the actions of their government
leaders. Ordinary citizens would be placed in the untenable position of
being compelled, at their peril, to choose between patriotism and treason.
The imposition of collective, moral, and legal guilt on the German people
would permit prosecutors, at their discretion, to pursue the mass prosecution
and punishment of Germans. This not only was viewed as philosophically
objectionable, but also was viewed as preventing the construction of a
stable, post-World War II Germany integrated into the Western Alliance as
a bulwark against the Soviet Union.15
However, ordinary Germans certainly had the legal privilege under
international law to blockade trains which they reasonably believed were
transporting individuals to concentration camps. Ordinary Germans also
had the legal privilege to smuggle Jewish children out of Germany. Those
who prosecuted and convicted such individuals, were themselves, subject to
prosecution by post-World War II war crimes tribunals. Contemporary
Americans, in contrast to the German inhabitants of the Third Reich, live
in a democracy in which they have relatively free access to information
concerning the activities of their government; and do not face severe
repression or death if they protest or act to interfere with government
policies. Americans also have the opportunity and theoretical ability to
mobilize public opinion and to influence the policies of their government.
The moral imperative for Americans to act is compelling. The Uffited
States' foreign and economic decisions have a substantial impact on people
throighout the world, many of whom have little capacity to influence
America's international policies. Americans, unfortunately, are not immune
from the "good German" syndrome. Psychological studies suggest Ameri-
cans are prone to accept and to carry out the dictates of authority figures
and to suppress their moral qualms. 16 The Nuremberg Tribunal, by implicitly
portraying Nazi atrocities as the result of the machinations of a small,
powerful, and monstrous clique, contributed to blinding many Americans.
It is inconceivable to Americans that the conduct of their seemingly normal
and responsible leaders might, in some instances, resemble that of the Nazis.
Americans, for the most part, are entirely unaware that their unbridled
combatants based solely upon their participation in a war of aggression. Instead, the Tribunal
directed their attention to those who formulated, shaped, and directed the policies of the Third
Reich. See Lippman, Nuremberg, supra note 1.
15. See generally Lippman, The Denaturalization of Nazi War Criminals in the United
States: Is Justice Being Served? 7 Hous. J. INT'L L. 169 (1985).
16. See S. MmILRAi, OBEDRENCE To AuTmonrry: AN ExPEaR NrAL Vmw (1969).
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patriotism may lead to the same tragic results as German passivity under
the Third Reich.
The moral imperative of citizens to resist tyrannical authority is artic-
ulated explicitly by foundation democratic theorists such as Locke and
Rousseau, by the Declaration of Independence of 1776, by the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789, and by colonial
constitutions such as that of New Hampshire. In the contemporary era, this
prerogative has evolved into a right of ideological self-defense that permits
individuals to act in a limited, proportionate, and nonviolent fashion, to
combat the systematic violation of the international human rights of all
peoples. This right is not based, as in the past, upon seemingly amorphous
concepts such as natural law or social contract theory, but derives from
positive international human rights law. To the extent that such rights are
inalienable and inherent in the human personality, a regime cannot claim
legitimacy for policies which violate such entitlements. The right of citizen
action, to protect the rights of citizens and others, is a necessary counter
to the fact that individuals must look tq governmental regimes that, for
their self-preservation, often have a vested interest in curbing rights.17 Unlike
the right of revolution posited by democratic theorists, the right of "ideo-
logical self-defense" does not necessarily entail a grand uprising against
tyrannical authority. Instead, it envisions "petty resistance" to intransgres-
sions, in an attempt to prevent a regime from slipping into a repressive
stance systematically violative bf human rights. 8 Such acts of resistance are
essential to intrude upon and to interrupt the psychological processes that
assist in rationalizing, numbing, and disassociating decision-makers and
citizens from evil. 19
* International human rights instruments, consistent with their purpose,
should be interpreted so as to impose duties and obligations to protect
human rights on individuals as well as on states. 2° The Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights2' and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights2 of 1966 both provide in the preamble that the
individual, "having duties to other individuals and to the community to
which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and
observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant."' 3 Professor
17. See supra note 8.
18. See Kaufman, Small Scale Right to Resist, 21 NEw ENo. L. Rnv. 571 (1985-86).
19. See generally R. LIFrON & E. MARKUSEN, THE GENOCIDAL MENTAcrnm: NAZI HOLO-
CAUST AND NucLEAR THREAT (1990).
20. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 31(c), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
21. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XX1), Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force on March 23, 1976 and signed by the United
States on December 31, 1979).
22. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force on January 3, 1967 and signed by the United States on
December 31, 1979).
23. Supra notes 21 & 22, at Preamble.
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Jordon Paust of the University of Houston goes so far as to argue that the
people of a given community "have the right under international law to
alter, abolish or overthrow an oppressive government."
' 4
Thus, human rights instruments, when interpreted in light of their
humanitarian purpose, at a minimum, formally establish a legal privilege
for individuals to act in a nonviolent, proportionate fashion to protest and
to attempt to prevent a regime's violation of international human rights.
Contemporary civil resisters who are acting to safeguard human rights are
the inheritors of the Nuremberg tradition and, in fact, they often refer to
their protest activities as "Nuremberg actions." These individuals are serving
as private attorney generals on behalf of the international community to
ensure compliance with the "common standard of achievement for all
peoples and nations."' 2
While recognition of an internationally recognized human right to engage
in nonviolent resistance appears utopian, international law historically has
provided for a political offender exception to extradition. This is an implicit
recognition of the right of rebellion against government authority. Govern-
ments, including that of the United States, recognize the right of those
abroad to engage in armed. and often violent revolt. It is a modest extension
for individuals to claim the prerogative to engage in the nonviolent pro-
portionate violation of domestic law.2 Historically, in the common law,
there was no organized system of law enforcement, and individuals had the
primary responsibility to protect their community. In the contemporary era,
in the absence of an organized international force capable of limiting the
conduct of nation-states, individuals must take the initiative to protect
human rights.
Ci DISOBEDIENCE AND CIVIL RESISTANCE
Traditional civil disobedience posits that disobedients' violation of the
law must be undertaken in accordance with a number of strictures designed
to limit the detrimental consequences resulting from protesters' activities.
Individuals, if possible, should violate the specific law to which they object
in an open, nonviolent fashion, plead guilty, and accept their punishment.
The use of force will lead to an escalating cycle of violence and distract
attention from the focus of the protest. Because inevitably there is uncer-
tainty concerning the validity of a protester's views, the infliction of harm
on others cannot be justified.27 There is a close relationship between means
24. Paust, Aggression Against Authority: The Crime of Oppression, Politicide and Other
Crimes Against Human Rights, 18 EMoRY L.J. 283, 297-98 (1986).
25. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 6, at preamble.
26. See Lippman, The Political Offender Exception in International Extradition Law:
Terrorism Versus Human Rights, 13 Ir'L J. Comp. & APPL D C.J. 45-7 (1989).
27. It is this uncertainty as to the truth which led Gandhi and Martin Luther King to
undertake self-reflection and purification prior to engaging in nonviolence to insure that they
were reasonably certain of the virtuousness of their cause.
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and ends, and the use of violence institutionalizes force as a mode of
dispute resolution. Furthermore, violence is viewed as reducing people to
impersonal objects, which is inconsistent with the very humanitarian values
that disobedients seek to promote.
A major precept of civil disobedience is that the disobedients plead
guilty and accept their punishment to indicate the depth of their commitment
to their cause and to symbolize their willingness to suffer for their beliefs.
This also demonstrates protesters' belief in and respect for the legal system
and is a manifestation of the fact that protesters object to a particular law
rather than to the entire legal system. By pleading guilty and accepting their
punishment, protesters also minimize the possibility that others will be
encouraged by their example to arbitrarily disregard the law. Moreover,
there is the Socratic argument that, having benefitted from the largesse and
opportunities presented by a society, a moral person would be acting unjustly
if that person claimed exemption from societal laws and obligations.2
Civil disobedience is criticized as profoundly undemocratic in that
disobedients are alleged to rely upon coercion and intimidation to achieve
their goals. However, civil disobedience is based upon a supreme belief in
the power of democracy. It is an attempt to appeal to public opinion and
sentiment and to mobilize these forces behind the disobedients' cause. To
the extent that disobedients violate the law to provide for judicial review
of the statutes under which they have been indicted, they are helping to
insure that existing laws conform to constitutional principles.
While traditional civil disobedience was justified primarily on amorphous
moral grounds, the new civil resistance is based on international law. Civil
resisters typically contend that the domestic law to which they object is
contrary to international law, and they claim that their criminal act was a
justified attempt to halt an ongoing governmental illegality. Resisters gen-
erally plead not guilty and attempt to introduce a defense -based upon
international law. These protesters thus prefer to view themselves as engaged
in acts of justified civil resistance rather than in acts of concededly criminal
civil disobedience.
By denying their guilt, civil resisters implicitly reflect a deep cynicism
concerning the government. The government is not merely a benign, but
occasionally misguided, enterprise. It is also an institution that is capable
of intentionally engaging in illegitimate criminal conduct. In such circum-
stances, it would be ingenuous for resisters passively to plead guilty and to
accept the punishment meted out. By seeking to offer a defense, resisters
are symbolically distancing themselves from the activities of the government
and are promoting the primacy of the rule of law. The resisters' trial
28. The disobedient's plea of guilty and acceptance of punishment places the judge in
the position of having to weigh the disobedient's actions and claims and to determine whether
the judge is sufficiently confident in the justifiability of the public policy being challenged to
punish the disobedient. The judge thus is confronted with a moral choice. The prosecutor, of
course, is faced with the question of whether to prosecute the case.
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provides them with the opportunity to focus public attention on the pattern
and the impact of governmental illegality; and to obtain an independent
evaluation of the justifiability of their conduct from a jury of their peers.
Civil resisters are akin to selective conscientious objectors (those who object
to a specific war rather than to all war) who refuse to compromise their
sense of citizenship and patriotism and refuse to accept and contribute to
what they view as governmental immorality and illegality. 29
The judiciary, however, has rejected defenses based upon international
law on the grounds that defendants lack standing to raise such defenses
and that the introduction of such defenses would violate the political
question doctrine. The judiciary, in essence, has concluded that it will not
permit defendants to raise criminal defenses that indirectly necessitate the
adjudication of the legality of United States foreign and national security
policies. In the view of the judiciary, defendants are seeking to use the
criminal law to circumvent the procedural barriers that priovent the litigation
of such issues in civil injunctive actions.
30  I
The so-called Nuremberg defense has been rejected explicitly by various
courts on the basis that the defendants have not been able to demonstrate
that they were required or ordered to engage in war crimes. Courts also
have ruled that Nuremberg principles imposes no liability on private civilians
or on low ranking combatants that would afford them either the duty or
privilege to violate the law.3 ' They have observed, in dicta, that no demo-
cratic principle compels a society to recognize the right of individuals to
violate domestic law under the aegis of international law. In the view of
the judiciary, the proper avenue for the redress of social grievances is the
political process. Judicial endorsement of civil resistance would lead to an
"anarchical result. ' 32
In an attempt to circumvent the judiciary's rejection of international
law defenses, defendants indirectly have raised international law arguments
by relying upon the necessity defense.
TiE NEcEssrrY DEFENSE
Civil disobedients have strained unsuccessfully to develop a theory upon
which to legally justify their violation of the law. The judiciary, however,
consistently has rejected justifications based upon theories ranging from
freedom of expression and religion to mistake of fact. Courts also have
29. See Lippman, The Recognition of Conscientious Objection to Military Service as an
International Human Right, 21 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 31 (1990). But see Gillette v. United States,
401 U.S. 437 (1971). It, of course, is paradoxical for civil resisters to look to the state judiciary
to vindicate their actions. However, resisters appear to adhere to a firm belief in the inherent,
independent authority of the rule of law.
30. See United States v. May, 622 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 984
(1980).
31. See United States v. Kabat, 797 F.2d 580, 590 (8th Cir. 1980).
32. See People v. Weber, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6, 208 Cal. Rptr. 719, 722 (1984).
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demonstrated little receptivity to innovative defenses such as the so-called
good motive or jury nullification instructions.33
During the anti-Vietnam era, the first efforts were taken by defense
attorneys towards the development of the necessity defense to justify political
protest. In recent years, the defense has been invoked by those in the
environmental, anti-abortion, and gay activist movements. However, the
defense has been utilized most frequently by antinuclear and peace activists
and has resulted in significant acquittals at the trial court level. However,
the application of the defense in cases of political protest has been rejected
almost uniformly by appellate courts.
Historically, necessity has been a rather loosely defined doctrine which
has been applied sporadically by the courts to moderate the harshness of
the criminal law in cases involving rather minor transgressions. The defense
was applied in cases in which defendants broke the law to avoid the
occurrence of a greater harm than was created by the defendant's illegal
act. It usually was left to the jury to determine whether the defendant's act
in jettisoning cargo to prevent a barge from sinking or killing wild animals
out of hunting season to protect crops was justified on the basis of
necessity.1
4
The Model Penal Code draft necessity statute of 1958 adopts a broad
interpretation of necessity and imposes few threshold requirements on the
defense. For instance, there is no requirement that the threatened "evil"
be imminent or that an emergency exist.35 In 1980, the United States Supreme
Court conceded that the contours of the necessity defense were so vague
that the defense could best be understood by viewing its application in
concrete cases.
36
One of the first indications that the necessity defense might be used by
those seeking social reform was the judicial application and extension of
the defense to justify prison escapes. Some judges expressed the hope that
recognition of the defense in penal settings might embarrass correctional
officials and encourage them to improve prison conditions.3 7
As the civil rights and anti-Vietnam movements of the 1960s gained
momentum, the prospect of protesters relying on the common law necessity
defense motivated various state legislatures to adopt rigid statutory limita-
tions. These statutes were inspired by the restrictive New York necessity
33. See generally Lippman, Civil Disobedience: The Dictates Of Conscience Versus The
Rule Of Law, supra note 1.
34. The historical argument presented in this section is elaborated upon in Lippman,
The Necessity Defense and Political Protest, supra note 1.
35. MODEL PENAL CODE 3.02 (Tent. Draft No. 8 1958). The Model Penal Code views
necessity as a justification defense. This means that although it involves a formal violation of
the criminal law, that it deserves neither criminal liability nor censure. Unlike excuse, which
absolves only a particular defendant, justification serves as a defense for all similarly situated
individuals. Necessity, in effect, is a recognition that certain obligations and values transcend
those embodied in positive law. Id.
36. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 392, 397 (1980).
37. See, e.g., People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1974).
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law that, for instance, requires that the necessity actually existed, not merely
that the defendant had a reasonable belief in the necessity of action. Under
the New York statute, the defendant's conduct not only must be necessary
as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent harm, but the desirability
and urgency of avoiding the injury clearly must outweigh the harm sought
to be prevented by the statute defining the offense committed by the
defendant."8 Most importantly, the commentary to the New York statute
stipulates that the defense is unavailable to the 'mercy killer, the crusader
who considers a penal statute unsalutary because it tends to obstruct his
cause, and the like."' 3 9 The latter comment clearly appears to be intended
to deny the defense to those attempting to justify acts of civil disobedience
directed at politically or morally objectionable policies.
4
0
Even in the absence of statutory limiting provisions, appellate courts
have demonstrated hostility towards the necessity defense. Appellate courts
have, for instance, interpreted state statutes to require that defendants
demonstrate that the harm sought to be avoided was imminent and imme-
diate.
Thus, over time, the broad and flexible common-law necessity defense
has been restricted by courts and legislatures. These precedents and statutes
have been rigidly applied to deny civil resisters the opportunity to rely upon
the defense at trial. This mechanical application of the necessity defense is
reminiscent of the analysis employed by nineteenth century judges to justify
decisions upholding the institution of slavery.
Tnm NEcEssrrY DEFENSE AND POLITICAL PROTEST
The restrictive, contemporary version of the necessity defense, as applied
by federal and by most state courts, has four requirements: (1) the defendant
is faced with a clear and imminent danger, not one which is debatable or
speculative; (2) the defendant can reasonably expect that his action will be
effective in abating the threatened danger; (3) there is no legal alternative
which will be effective in alleviating the danger; and (4) the Legislature has
not acted to preclude the application of the defense.
4'
Protesters relying upon international law typically claim that the alleged
illegal activity which they are challenging (such as the deployment of nuclear
weapons) is reasonably believed to pose a greater harm or threat than their
violation of the law, that acts of civil disobedience historically have served
as a catalyst for political reform, that legal efforts to eradicate the harm
38. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 35.05 (McKinney 1975).
39. Quoted in Tiffany & Anderson, Legislating the Necessity Defense in Criminal Law,
52 DENVER L.J. 839, 844 (1975).
40. See Sullivan, The Defense of Necessity in Texas: Legislative Invention Comes of
Age, 16 Hous. L. REV. 333, 336 n.29 (1979) (listing state statutes inspired by the New York
necessity provision).
41. See Commonwealth v. Brugmann, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 373, 379, 433 N.E.2d 457, 461
(1982).
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have proven ineffective and futile, and that the necessity defense is not
precluded by statute.
Appellate decisions rejecting the necessity defense have concluded that
the harm was not sufficiently immediate or imminent to invoke the defense,
that the protesters' acts were rjot calculated to eliminate the threatened
harm, that there were available legal alternatives through which the protes-
ters might have modified the governmental policies that they view as posing
a harm, and that the legislature intended to preclude reliance upon the
defense in this particular instance. Protesters' failure to satisfy one or more
of the threshold requirements has resulted in their being denied the oppor-
tunity to rely upon the necessity defense.
As stated, appellate courts have held that the harm sought to be
prevented by the protesters is not sufficiently immediate or imminent to
justify invocation of the necessity defense. For instance, a nuclear war or
accident is considered by the courts to be speculative and uncertain and
does not present an imminent danger. The judiciary also has rejected efforts
to extend the defense to harms that are not immediate, reasoning that this
would stretch the defense to encompass distant events far from the situs of
the protest.
42
Nonviolent protest activities, such as the confiscation of draft records,
have been held to be insufficiently calculated to eliminate completely the
threatened harm or to change governmental policy. The mobilization of
public opinion that, in turn, may influence governmental policy, also is
considered by the courts to be too indirect to satisfy the requirement that
the act immediately extinguish the threatened danger.
43
Given the lack of imminency (and immediacy) of the harm, courts
consider appellants to possess the opportunity to utilize legally recognized
avenues to achieve their desired goal. Although such activities often are
conceded to be time consuming and onerous, courts note that mere impa-
tience and frustration do not constitute a legal necessity for protesters to
violate the law. The fact that the actions of protesters may have failed to
bring about political reform, in the view of some judges, may indicate that
their appeal has been considered and rejected by the electorate. 44
In addition, courts have determined that the nature of legislation
precludes reliance upon the necessity defense to justify criminal acts com-
mitted to protest allegedly harmful governmental programs. The fact that
the legislative branch has stafutorily enacted or, in some other manner,
approved of a program is sufficient to conclude that the program does not
constitute a social harm or evil. To rule otherwise would require the judiciary
to question the judgment of the legislative branch and to violate the
separation of powers. This would result in the courts substituting their
judgment for that of the democratically elected legislature.
45
42. See State v. Warshow, 138 Vt. 22, 25, 410 A.2d 1000, 1002 (1979).
43. See Commonwealth v. Averill, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 262, 423 N.E.2d 6, 7-8 (1981).
44. See United States v. Quilty, 741 F.2d 1031, 1033 (7th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
45. See State v. Hubbard, 115 Mich. App. 73, 79, 320 N.W.2d 294, 297 (1982) (per
curiam).
THE NECESSITY OF POLITICAL PROTEST
In the end, courts have refused to permit defendants who have violated
various minor property laws to utilize the necessity defense to challenge
indirectly governmental policies reasonably believed to violate international
law. Courts express the fear that permitting defendants to rely upon the
necessity defense in such instances would lead to anarchy, the pillaging of
markets and banks to feed the poor, committing trespass to house the
homeless, and occupying hospitals to alleviate the pain of the destitutp.
Those who are able to mobilize the strongest and most vociferous mob in
the street then would be empowered to dictate public policy.46
TnE NEcEssrrY DEFENSE RECONSIDERED
The judiciary, in ruling on necessity, must concede that the harm created
by nonviolent protesters is minor when compared to the potential conse-
quences of a nuclear accident or war or of a foreign military incursion. To
wait until such a harm is about to occur is unrealistic and impractical. The
value that society places upon human life dictates that courts should flexibly
interpret the imminency standard when considering whether to permit de-
fendants to rely upon the necessity defense. Imminency is not a rigid
standard and must be interpreted in light of the values allegedly threatened.
Although complex and ongoing harms, such as state-sponsored terror-
ism, strictly are not immediate, they often are so severe and life threatening
that the immediacy requirement should be considered satisfied. Those in
the United States have a particular obligation to protect the victims of such
harms who often do not have access to democratic institutions to protect
their rights.
It is ingenuous to require that the acts of resisters completely remedy
a complex harm. It, of course, is impossible to eliminate world hunger or
homelessness through a single action. The contention of protesters is that
their action, in combination with the actions of others, will eliminate the
harm. America has a rich tradition of civil disobedience. In fact, many of
the most significant events in American history, such as the Boston Tea
Party, were acts of civil disobedience that helped to usher in social and
political change.
The judiciary's admonition that protesters possess legal avenues for
change is a talismanic chant that permits courts to avoid confronting the
grievances of protesters. Another letter always can be written, an additional
politician visited, or another foundation approached for funds. It should
be sufficient that the defendants are able to demonstrate good faith efforts
to remedy legally the harm being challenged. It is unfortunate that the
democracy described in our civics books does not always resemble our
contemporary reality and that well-meaning citizens may find themselves
lacking the resources and the skills to influence public policy. In the end,
the availability of effective legal alternatives is a question of fact rather
than of law.
46. See People v. Weber, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1, 5, 208 Cal. Rptr. 719, 721 (1984).
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Legislative preemption of the necessity defense has been implied by
courts through the conclusion that legislative action in an area precludes
application of necessity. The common-law necessity defense, like self-de-
fense, is an implied exception to criminal statutes. It is an inherent right,
and courts, prior to making a finding of legislative preemption, are obligated
to determine that there has been a clear legislative choice explicitly to
preclude the defense in a given set of circumstances. State courts, of course,
should be particularly hesitant to conclude that there is federal preemption
of a defense recognized under a state criminal code.
Courts, as a matter of law, should not deny defendants in political
protest cases involving international law claims, the opportunity to submit
their necessity defense arguments to the jury. It never is strictly necessary
for an individual to act to prevent a harm-they merely can suffer the
consequences of inaction. When an individual is compelled to break the
law to protest nonviolently what they reasonably believe to be a violation
of international human rights, the jury should be permitted to determine
whether the individual made a socially proper choice of values. This, and
not the existence of an emergency, is the touchstone of the necessity
defense. 47
In sum, in civil resistance cases the necessity defense should be refor-
mulated in accordance with its original broad and flexible nature.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATION
Whether it is necessity, the admissibility of a defendant's motive, or
jury nullification, a humane society should provide flexibility in the adju-
dication of politically inspired nonviolent crimes committed as part of a
conflict over morally controversial international human rights issues. This
interest is even more compelling when protesters are charged with property
crimes committed to preserve human life. The courtroom should be trans-
formed into a judicial town meeting whose integrity is safeguarded by the
rules of evidence and decorum.
Such an approach is not likely to lead to anarchy. Few people are so
deeply motivated and committed to a political cause that they are willing
to violate the law to raise a political issue in court. A trial involves a
significant drain on personal resources and presents the risk of criminal
conviction and punishment. In any event, even if a large number of
individuals were to engage in acts of civil resistance, it must be remembered
that civil resisters are upholding rather than denigrating the rule of law.
To the extent that democratic institutions function efficiently and fairly,
the temptation to engage in acts of nonviolent resistance are lessened.
American society will not be strained by a liberal approach to nonviolent
political crime. On the contrary, the political debate is likely to be enlivened
47. This helps to explain why economic necessity and the necessity defense as a justifi-
cation for murder are not recognized. The values involved in the latter two cases are considered
to outweigh any countervailing considerations.
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and broadened. Those concerned about social anarchy might better devote
their attention to the rampant crime in the streets and in the suites.
Courts, in addition to the fear that recognition of necessity for nonvi-
olent political offenses will promote social anarchy, are concerned that the
use of the judicial forum to adjudicate political causes will undermine the
neutrality and integrity of the legal system and of the judiciary. Denying
protesters the ability to rely upon the necessity defense, thus, in part, is
motivated by a desire to channel political debates into other avenues of
expression. Various courts, of course, have permitted defendants to rely
upon the necessity defense without sacrificing judicial order and decorum.
In the United States, political controversies inevitably have been transformed
into legal disputes, and courts are not unfamiliar with the adjudication of
explosive issues. By denying protesters the use of the necessity defense,
courts merely are endorsing the status quo and abdicating their constitutional
duty to permit criminal defendants to introduce a defense.
In my rather extensive experience, in civil resistance cases in which
defendants have been permitted to rely upon the necessity defense, a
significant percentage have been acquitted by a jury of their peers. It thus
must be questioned whether the denial of the defense can be justified
convincingly on the grounds of democratic principle. The political nature
of the prosecution of nonviolent protesters is emphasized by the often harsh
sentences meted out to protesters. In United States v. Kabat,4 the defen-
dants, including two Roman Catholic priests, who occupied and damaged
a Minuteman II intercontinental ballistic missile site were sentenced to terms
ranging from eight to eighteen years in prison plus other penalties. In his
dissent, Judge Bright observed that the protesters neither physically harmed
anyone nor interfered with the functioning of the missile. 49 Yet, Judge
Bright noted that the "sentences are akin to penalties often imposed on
violent criminals, such as robbers and rapists, or on those guilty of crimes
considered heinous, such as drug dealers. ' ' 50 It is ingenuous for the judiciary
to claim that they view nonviolent, political protest cases as common crimes
and then, as in State v. Wentworth,51 impose a six month prison sentence
upon a first-time offender convicted of trespass at a nuclear power plant,
under the rationale that such a penalty is necessary to convince the ideal-
istically motivated defendant to rely upon lawful means of protest.52
Protesters are acting to uphold the rule of law and their violation of
the law would not be required if courts were receptive to civil claims based
upon international law. Those nonviolently breaking the law to protect
human rights are not capriciously violating the law, but are seeking the
opportunity to justify their conduct before a jury of their peers.
48. 797 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1980).
49. United States v. Kabat, 797 F.2d 580, 594 (8th Cir. 1980).
50. Id. at 594.
51. 118 N.H. 832, 395 A.2d 858 (1978).
52. State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 843, 395 A.2d 858, 865 (1978).
1991]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:235
It must be recognized that while the rule of law is necessary to societal
stability, not all laws are consistent with the social welfare. Particularly
during periods of war and national emergency, societies may deviate from
democratic norms. In retrospect, it would be difficult to deny the prerogative
to nonviolently resist the law to Japanese-Americans facing internment
during World War II, to Native-Americans being forcefully expelled from
their homes, to African-Americans being sold into slavery or denied access
to public facilities, or to an American combatant in Vietnam ordered to
spray the Agent Orange defoliant.
It must be questioned whether the condemnation of those who violate
the law based upon principle merely is a psychologically comforting reaction
by the inhabitants of a politically passive and indolent society who prefer
not to confront the wrenching issues of homelessness, racial discrimination,
poverty, and inaction in the face of international lawlessness. The United
States that was founded on revolution has replaced the old doctrine of the
divine right of kings with a new theory. This theory posits that self-correcting
constitutional procedures obviate the need to recognize the citizen's right to
resort to extrajudicial measures of reform.53 Democratic participation has
come to be viewed a matter of periodic voting (and consumer choice) rather
than of active and sustained political participation.
The necessity defense has been recognized as providing a justification
for resistance to arbitrary authority. In 1834, in United States v. Ashton,
54
Judge Story ruled that the crew of an unseaworthy vessel rightfully was
justified under the necessity defense in insisting that the captain return to
port.15 In language which United States courts should continue to heed in
ruling on the right of contemporary protesters to rely upon the necessity
defense, Judge Story observed that crew members are not bound to continue
on a voyage which presents a risk to their lives "merely because the master
and officers choose in their rashness of judgement to proceed. ' 5 6 In the
event that the master and officers insist on continuing on an unsafe voyage,
Story concluded that "the crew have a right to resist, and to refuse
obedience." '57 One historian has noted that in the nuclear age, nation-states
are "chronic criminals far more dangerous than the solitary practitioner of
nonviolent civil disobedience. In the meantime, by saying 'No' that disobeyer
will seek to recall authority to common sense.''58
53. See Kittrie, Patriots and Terrorists: Reconciling Human Rights With World Order,
13 CAsE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 291, 295 (1981). Despite my argument, I recognize that a number
of philosophical issues continue to cause concern and merit further exploration. These include:
whether the use of the necessity defense will unduly politicize the judicial process, the extent
to which a pluralism of belief and practice can be accommodated within a society, the
infectious potential of law violation, the extent to which it is possible to distinguish between
the justifiability of civil resistance in various instances, and whether political crime should be
dealt with separately as a distinct category of offenses.
54. 247 F. Cas. 873 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 14,4707).
55. United States v. Ashton, 247 F. Cas. 873, 874 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 14, 4707).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Lynd, Civil Disobedience in Wartime, 19 ME. L. REv. 49, 54 (1967).
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Society has an abundance of quiet conformists who blindly follow
authority and suppress all tendencies to place moral constraints on their
conduct. The admirable virtues of patriotism and loyalty are the very traits
that, when not tempered by moral autonomy, create the potential for
collective involvement in, support for, or indifference to, the violation of
internationally guaranteed human rights. 9
The criminal justice system, that so often is condemned as a vehicle of
repression and injustice, now should accommodate the expression of political
dissent and help to preserve American democracy. A mark of a truly mature
democracy is the willingness to accept that no political ideology has an
absolute claim to truth and that today's dogmas may be replaced by ideas
which presently are considered to b6 repugnant. Intolerance towards non-
violent dissent eventually leads to frustration and to violence. It is for these
reasons, among others, that the voices of nonviolent dissent should be
tolerated and permitted to compete in the judicial forum. It is time to tear
down the Berlin Wall that prevents civil resisters from pleading the necessity
defense in an attempt to justify their formally criminal conduct and to open
the judicial politburo to the voices of change and reform.
59. See S. MmGRAM, supra note 16, at 89.
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